It is an interesting coincidence that I am writing these lines at the Villa Serbelloni, the site of a series of meetings on theoretical biology organized by Waddington in 1968 Waddington in -1972 [1] , for it is from this discipline that my question for Wolpert's good fairy godmother of science [2] arises. Can models of the function of complex biological systems help us to understand the evolutionary transitions that were necessary to bring these systems into being?
The first thing that comes to mind is a book by Tibor Gánti published at about the same time (in Hungarian) [3, 4] . Gánti attempted to redefine the basic criteria of life in the light of developments in molecular biology and to present a model of 'minimal life'. I think the attempt was successful but has been overlooked. Gánti's basic biological unit, called a chemoton, consists of three subsystems: an intermediary metabolism cycle, a replicating template macromolecule and an encapsulating membrane. All the chemoton's subsystems are autocatalytic, and the system is autocatalytic as a whole. The chemoton has been described in terms of stoichiometric and kinetic equations, and the production of such a system in the lab may be feasible in the not too remote future [5] .
Can we work out similar models of the organization of the higher levels of life: eukaryotic cells, multicellular organisms and animal societies? This cannot be expected to be an easy task, and Wolpert is rightly sceptical about the computability of embryogenesis [2] -but I am not entirely sceptical. Models that are hybrids between genetic networks and cellular automata are able to regenerate basic forms of multicellularity in the computer [6] . And we may get to the stage when not only grand physical theories, but also basic biological theories, will need computers specially built for their analysis.
As soon as one has a family of models, the principles derived from them should be very helpful for the analysis of crucial evolutionary transitions. Using as clues the "unmistakable footprints of selection" [7] , one can now work out sensible scenarios even for transitions -such as the origin of the genetic code [8] -that have been regarded as 'notoriously difficult'.
This gives one hope that such a research strategy is worthwhile even for the last major biological transition: the emergence of the human language capacity [9] . If one believes that language has a biological basis and that crucial aspects of it are innate (genetic), then it follows that there must be genetic variation to this capacity [10] . Another crucial claim is that there is a 'language organ', acting in the brain as a linguistic processor, with many hardwired features. If this is so, specific language impairment (SLI) should exist, and some of its forms must have an unequivocal genetic basis. We referred to one example of familial SLI in our book [9] , only to discover subsequently that it appears not to be specific to language at all: many affected people in the family suffer from a low IQ as well [11] . Nevertheless, analyses of other such impairments are sure to prove fruitful [10] .
We do not yet have a sensible evolutionary scenario for the origin of language. Linguistics is at the stage at which genetics found itself immediately after Mendel. There are rules (of sentence production), but we do not yet know what mechanisms (neural networks) are responsible for each rule. We may nevertheless be able to postulate grammatical rules of intermediate complexity (between protolanguage and our language), and we can analyse how one strategy replaces another in the computerbut most biologists would feel uneasy with this because they would not be convinced that the whole scenario is feasible in neurobiological terms. It seems safe to predict that 'theoretical evolutionary neurolinguistics' will become a hot topic, and new principles are likely to emerge with its continuing study.
